OpenAI i la febre de les IPO d’IA: vendre accions no prova que hi hagi una bombolla
Les IPO, la despesa de 725.000 M$ i el retorn dels pilots d’IA alimenten l’alerta. Contrastem el vídeo amb la SEC, OpenAI i les dades històriques.
El vídeo de Casual Finance defensa que les grans empreses privades d’intel·ligència artificial volen sortir a borsa perquè els fundadors i inversors «intel·ligents» intenten traspassar actius sobrevalorats al públic. Hi afegeix el volum de despesa en centres de dades, el retorn encara modest de molts projectes d’IA i els precedents de les puntcom i les SPAC.
Hi ha advertiments útils: una gran tecnologia no garanteix una bona inversió a qualsevol preu, i els compradors d’una IPO han de llegir el fullet. Però el mecanisme central del vídeo és massa simple. Sortir a borsa pot donar liquiditat als accionistes antics, però també pot captar capital nou per a l’empresa; no demostra que tots els informats corrin cap a la sortida.
Una IPO no és sempre «els fundadors venent-te les seves accions»
Al minut 1:01, el vídeo presenta la sortida a borsa com una transacció entre insiders que ho saben tot i inversors minoristes que ho saben menys.
Una IPO pot contenir dues classes d’accions:
- primàries, emeses per l’empresa; els diners entren a la companyia per finançar creixement, deute o operacions;
- secundàries, venudes per accionistes existents; els ingressos van a aquests venedors.
El butlletí de la SEC explica que moltes grans IPO inclouen sobretot accions noves i que el fullet identifica els «selling shareholders». A més, fundadors, empleats i fons solen quedar subjectes a un període de bloqueig, sovint de 180 dies.
Per tant, la pregunta correcta no és només «per què venen?». També és: quina part és primària, qui ven, quant conserva, a què es destinarà el capital, quina dilució hi haurà i quan venç el bloqueig.
OpenAI ha obert la porta, però no ha fixat una data
El 8 de juny del 2026, OpenAI va confirmar que havia presentat confidencialment un esborrany S-1 a la SEC. L’empresa va dir explícitament que encara no havia decidit el calendari i que podia trigar perquè hi ha coses més fàcils de fer com a empresa privada.
Això crea l’opció d’una IPO, no una venda consumada. Com que el document és confidencial, el públic encara no pot veure comptes auditats, riscos, estructura de l’oferta, ús dels fons o accions secundàries. El vídeo cita ingressos, pèrdues i una valoració de 852.000 milions de dòlars a partir d’informació filtrada o estimada; no són xifres d’un S-1 públic verificable.
El pas és rellevant, però convertir-lo en prova que Sam Altman o altres insiders «corren per vendre» avança una conclusió que el document públic encara no permet.
El patró històric de les IPO existeix, però no és un rellotge
Al minut 2:31, Casual Finance explica que les empreses surten a borsa quan l’optimisme permet obtenir valoracions altes. És cert que el volum d’ofertes tendeix a ser procíclic: quan la demanda cau, moltes operacions s’ajornen.
També hi ha evidència de rendiments decebedors després de moltes IPO. Les estadístiques actualitzades del professor Jay Ritter mostren que, entre 9.195 IPO nord-americanes del 1975 al 2021, un 38,5% havia perdut més de la meitat del valor al cap de tres anys des del primer tancament. Un altre 21,5% estava entre una pèrdua del 50% i zero.
Però la mateixa taula mostra una cua de grans guanyadores. La mitjana, la mediana, la mida de l’empresa, la rendibilitat prèvia i el preu d’oferta canvien molt el resultat. Una IPO calenta és un senyal de risc de valoració, no una prova automàtica d’un màxim de mercat.
Blackstone el 2007: un exemple real amb biaix retrospectiu
Al minut 3:33, el vídeo recorda que Blackstone va sortir a borsa el juny del 2007, poc abans de la crisi financera, i que els cofundadors van monetitzar part de la participació. L’acció va caure fortament durant la crisi.
Com a exemple narratiu és potent. Com a regla de predicció, és incomplet:
- un cas seleccionat després de conèixer el resultat no mesura totes les IPO;
- una venda parcial pot diversificar patrimoni sense implicar abandonament;
- el rendiment depèn del preu de compra i de l’horitzó;
- Blackstone va continuar operant i creixent després de la crisi.
La coincidència temporal no prova que una IPO permeti anticipar amb precisió la recessió següent.
La bombolla de les puntcom sí que adverteix sobre el preu
Al minut 4:04, el vídeo cita la concentració tecnològica de les ofertes del 1999, la caiguda superior al 75% del Nasdaq i la desaparició de moltes empreses joves.
La lliçó important és que una tecnologia transformadora i una bombolla poden coexistir. Internet va canviar l’economia, però molts compradors van pagar preus que assumien creixement perfecte o van finançar empreses sense avantatge sostenible.
La comparació amb la IA és una analogia, no una identitat. Avui part de la despesa prové d’empreses molt rendibles i ja cotitzades, mentre alguns proveïdors d’IA tenen ingressos reals a gran escala. El risc continua sent pagar ara per beneficis llunyans i incerts.
Les SPAC del 2021: el precedent més contundent
Després d’un segment patrocinat, el vídeo arriba al minut 6:37 a les SPAC: societats buides que capten diners i després es fusionen amb una empresa privada.
L’eufòria del 2020 i el 2021 va produir centenars d’operacions i resultats molt dolents per a molts compradors. Les dades de Ritter sobre 198 de-SPAC del 2021 indiquen una rendibilitat mitjana d’un any del −64,2% i de tres anys del −73%, abans d’ajustar per mercat.
Aquest és un advertiment fort sobre incentius, dilució i qualitat. Però una de-SPAC no és equivalent a una IPO tradicional: patrocinadors, warrants, drets de reemborsament i negociació de la fusió creen una estructura diferent. Usar-ne el fracàs per condemnar qualsevol futura IPO d’IA seria una extrapolació.
725.000 milions de despesa contra 110.000 milions d’ingressos
Al minut 8:09, Casual Finance afirma que les grans tecnològiques gastaran uns 725.000 milions de dòlars en IA el 2026 i compara aquesta xifra amb una estimació de 110.000 milions d’ingressos de tota l’economia de la IA.
La diferència mereix atenció, però la divisió del 15% no és un retorn sobre la inversió:
- la despesa de capital crea actius que s’amortitzen durant diversos anys;
- centres de dades, xarxa i xips també serveixen núvol, cerca, publicitat i altres càrregues;
- «ingressos de la IA» no té una definició comptable única;
- ingressos directes no inclouen necessàriament estalvis o protecció de negocis existents;
- per avaluar retorn cal considerar marges, vida útil, cost de capital i fluxos futurs.
Això no fa segura la inversió. Significa que comparar una despesa anual agregada amb una estimació d’ingressos diferent no permet sentenciar que sigui «horrible».
El 95% de pilots sense impacte no vol dir que la IA no funcioni
Al minut 10:12, el vídeo cita l’informe «The GenAI Divide» del projecte NANDA del MIT. El seu titular més repetit diu que el 95% de les organitzacions estudiades no obtenien retorn mesurable en el compte de resultats dels pilots de GenAI.
És un avís sobre integració, dades, processos i adopció, no una prova que el 95% de tots els projectes siguin tècnicament inútils. L’informe es basava en entrevistes, una enquesta i casos públics, no en una mostra aleatòria de totes les empreses. A més, Deloitte informava que només un 20% havia observat creixement d’ingressos, però un 66% declarava millores de productivitat i un 40% reducció de costos.
Un projecte pot fallar comercialment perquè resol el problema equivocat o no s’integra al flux de treball, encara que el model funcioni.
Valoració: aquí és on el vídeo té la millor pregunta
Al minut 11:13, el vídeo assenyala que les expectatives poden deixar poc marge per a bones notícies i molt per a decepcions. Aquest és el nucli correcte.
Una empresa extraordinària pot ser una mala inversió si el preu pressuposa:
- creixement molt alt durant molts anys;
- marges encara no demostrats;
- costos de computació a la baixa;
- regulació favorable;
- absència de competidors o substituts;
- capital nou sense dilució excessiva.
El fullet públic, quan existeixi, permetrà calcular pèrdues, consum de caixa, compromisos de computació, concentració de clients, accions amb vot múltiple i ús dels fons. Sense això, tant l’entusiasme com la predicció d’un col·lapse són especulatius.
En resum
Casual Finance encerta en dues advertències: les IPO apareixen sovint quan els venedors poden aconseguir preus alts, i la promesa tecnològica no elimina el risc de valoració. Les puntcom i les SPAC mostren què passa quan el relat corre molt per davant dels fonaments.
El vídeo exagera quan converteix qualsevol sortida a borsa en insiders entregant una «patata calenta» a inversors desinformats. Cal separar accions primàries de secundàries, llegir qui ven i recordar que una empresa també surt a borsa perquè necessita capital.
OpenAI ha presentat un S-1 confidencial, però encara no ha publicat l’oferta. Fins que ho faci, la decisió racional no és endevinar quan s’aturarà la música: és esperar informació, comparar valoració amb escenaris realistes i no confondre una tecnologia important amb un preu justificat. Aquest resum és informatiu i no és assessorament financer personal.
Contrast i context
Fonts consultades
-
01
Casual Finance The World's Smartest People Are Sprinting for the Same Exit
- 02
- 03
-
04
University of Florida Initial Public Offerings: Updated Long-run Statistics
Font de treball
Transcripció amb marques de temps
Consulta la transcripció
-
0:01
, obre el vídeo en una pestanya nova
Right now, the most valuable companies on Earth are racing to sell you their stock. It's more money, bigger names, and higher valuations than anything the stock market has ever seen. To some people, this is the opportunity of a lifetime. The greatest technology boom in history is finally opening its doors. For decades, the best companies stayed private, growing in the dark, and were out of reach for ordinary people. But now at last, the doors are being thrown open, and you get the chance to own a piece of the businesses that could define the next 100 years. But to others, this isn't a celebration at all. It's a trap. That's the side I'm on, and by the end of this video, I'm fairly confident you'll be on this side, too. Because in the stock market, an open door is never a favor. Generosity is never just out of the kindness of someone's heart. It's like nobody stopped to consider that in finance, every trade needs a counterparty. Every buyer needs a seller. So, if you're trying to buy stock, someone has to be willing to sell it to you. Which means before you buy what they're selling, there's one simple question worth asking. Why are they selling? In an initial public offering, the people on the other side of the trade aren't random. They're the founders who built these companies, the early employees who gave them years of their lives, the venture capitalists who funded them when they were nothing. Nobody on Earth understands these businesses better than they do, and they've seen the numbers you and I will never get to see. And they've looked at the most exciting companies of our lifetime, the ones everyone are desperate to own, and they made a decision. They'd rather have your cash than their own shares. This is what an IPO actually is. Strip away the headlines and the celebration, and it's
-
1:31
, obre el vídeo en una pestanya nova
a trade with massive information asymmetry. The sellers are the most informed people in the room, which means the buyer, by definition, is the least. And right now, that buyer is you. So, here's the thought that should be lighting up in the back of your mind, the one that Elon Musk, Sam Altman, and everyone else behind this wave are quietly counting on you not to ask. If these really are the most valuable, most important companies in the world, and the future is as bright as everyone keeps promising, then why are the people who know them best in such a hurry to sell them to you? And there's an answer. It's a pattern that's repeated throughout the history of the stock market. It's shown up again and again right before nearly every major financial bubble pops, and most people have no idea it's sitting right in front of their eyes. I call it the dine and dash. In poker, a tell is a small unconscious signal that gives away what someone actually believes, no matter what they're saying out loud. Well, markets have tells, too. They don't come from headlines or earnings calls, and they definitely don't come from CNBC. They come from watching what people actually do with their money. That's one of the clearest tells there is, because the average investor sells when they get scared, when the news turns or the chart drops, when everyone around them is already running for the door. But, the professionals do the exact opposite. As Benjamin Graham, the father of value investing and Warren Buffett's mentor, said, "The intelligent investor is a realist who sells to optimist and buys from pessimist." They sell when everything looks perfect, when the story
-
3:01
, obre el vídeo en una pestanya nova
is loudest, the optimism is highest, and there's a line of buyers out the door begging to get in, because that's the moment you can get the most money for the thing you're selling, which is exactly what the IPO data shows us. When markets are booming, companies rush to go public and sell shares. But, when markets turn south, those IPOs disappear faster than my situationship the second I ask her, "So, what are we?" That's the top being sold to you. And like I mentioned earlier, we've seen this pattern again and again throughout history. Let's go back to June of 2007. Wall Street was booming, the markets were hot, and the two founders of Blackstone, Stephen Schwarzman and Peter Peterson, decided it was time to cash in on some of it. Side note, who looks at a newborn and lands on the name Peter Peterson? Anyways, they took Blackstone public, and between them, the two co-founders walked away with about 2.6 billion dollars in cash. Then, a little over a year later, the global financial crisis hit, the markets crashed, and Blackstone's stock plummeted roughly 90%. It's almost like the soon-to-be world's largest alternative asset manager knew it was time to exit out of some assets. Or we can go back a little further to the dot-com bubble. In the years leading up to the dot-com crash, the number of companies going public exploded. And in 1999, the year before the bubble popped, the concentration hit a record. Of every company that went public that year, around 51% came from a single sector, tech. Then the year after all of them listed, after the insiders got rich and retail thought they were buying a piece of the digital future, the bubble popped. Over the next 2 and
-
4:34
, obre el vídeo en una pestanya nova
1/2 years, the Nasdaq crashed more than 75% and an estimated $5 trillion in market value simply evaporated. It took 15 years for the Nasdaq to recover. And most of the companies that sold stock on the way up never made it to the other side. A study by the Kauffman Foundation and Professor Jay Ritter, the man known as Mr. IPO, found that 10 years after going public, only 29% of the emerging growth companies that went public between 1996 and 2000 were still standing as independent public companies. The rest were gone. The thing people thought they were buying no longer existed. But in 2021, we saw the same tail show up wearing a different costume. But before I tell you what that costume was, a quick pause. Because that phrase hits close to today's sponsor. Out in the real world, someone wearing a costume that isn't theirs has a simpler name, a copycat. So picture this, you build something, it works, people know the name. Then one day, someone else shows up using it. Same name, same logo. That's when you realize using a name doesn't make it yours. Registering it does. Which brings us to the sponsor of today's video, Trademark. Trademark makes it simple to protect your brand globally by handling the entire trademark registration process for you. Here's how it works. Trademark starts by offering you up to four free in-depth trademark checks carried out by real lawyers, not just an AI scan. You then just send a name or a logo and they flag anything that could prevent registration like identical marks, confusing similarities, or legal red flags, all for free. And if your brand comes back clear, they register it in the countries
-
6:07
, obre el vídeo en una pestanya nova
you choose. But Trademark's protection doesn't just end after you register. Trademark continues monitoring your trademark, not just across government databases, but across the entire internet covering everything from social media to online stores to app platforms, so misuse gets caught early. And if someone does try to copy your name or logo, Trademark's legal team will step in and help you take action. If you're interested in checking out Trademark, you can get 20% off using the link below or by scanning the QR code. Promo code casual20. Thank you to Trademark for sponsoring this video. Now, back to that costume. Because in 2021, this same tale disguised itself as something Wall Street swore was the future. The SPAC. These are companies that go public before they're actually a company. You raise money from investors first, list on the exchange, and then go shopping for a real business to merge with. It's an empty shell with a checkbook, which is why people call them blank check companies. The appeal was simple. A SPAC let a private company reach the public market without sitting through the scrutiny of a normal IPO. It skipped a lot of the normal vetting process. So, the money came rushing in. In 2021 alone, 613 SPACs went public and raised more than 160 billion dollars. For a year, these blank check shells made up more than half of every new company hitting the US market. And the story ends exactly how you'd expect. Companies that completed a SPAC merger in 2021 lost 67% of their value on average. For those that de-SPACed in 2022, the average loss was 59%. And just like we
-
7:39
, obre el vídeo en una pestanya nova
saw in on com the activity collapsed right after the rug got pulled out from underneath everyone. From 248 SPACs in 2020 to 613 in 2021 to just 86 in 2022. That's the dine and dash. When markets are booming, insiders are selling. When markets aren't, they aren't selling. It's a cycle we've seen over and over. So, what about AI? There's still a question that needs answering. Why now? Why are the most valuable companies in the world, fierce rivals who agree on almost nothing, all racing to sell you stock at the exact same moment? It comes down to two numbers. The first being the spending. I covered this in a previous video, but since 88% of the people watching this aren't subscribed, here's the quick version. This year, the largest technology companies on Earth are on track to spend around $725 billion building out artificial intelligence. That's up roughly 77% from the year before. It's the largest and fastest infrastructure build out in history, but most people struggle to even conceptualize how much $725 billion actually is. So, I'll use the same example I used in my previous video because I think it captures the absurdity of this better than anything else. If you spent $1 million every single day starting from the day Jesus was born all the way through the fall of the Roman Empire, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, both World Wars, and every single day up to right now, you still wouldn't have spent what Big Tech alone will spend on AI in just 2026. It breaks down to roughly $2
-
9:11
, obre el vídeo en una pestanya nova
billion a day, 83 million an hour, or about $23,000 every second. But, there's also a second number that perfectly sums up the AI industry, and it's a number you probably have never seen. It's what all that spending is actually earning back. The research firm Exponential View put together the first real bottom-up estimate of the entire AI economy. Over the past 12 months, all of it combined generated an estimated $110 billion in revenue, and that's revenue, not profit. Put another way, the entire AI economy earned back an amount equal to roughly 15% of what Big Tech alone plans to spend this year. By any standard, that's a horrible investment. But I know what some of you are probably thinking. That's mostly Big Tech. Surely it's better for everyone else, like the actual businesses using this stuff. And the answer is no. It's actually far worse. Deloitte surveyed more than 3,000 business and IT leaders across 24 countries. They found that 74% of organizations want AI to grow their revenue, but only 20% have actually seen it happen. Another study by researchers at MIT looked even closer. They studied hundreds of real corporate AI rollouts, actual companies spending real money to put this technology to work, and they found that 95% of them produced zero measurable return. So, put those numbers side by side. $725 billion going in, almost nothing coming back out. That gap between what's being spent and what's being earned is what nobody seems to be watching. In fact, the market has priced these companies as if that gap doesn't
-
10:42
, obre el vídeo en una pestanya nova
even exist. Take OpenAI, the company sitting in the eye of the storm. OpenAI is still private, but the financials leaked, and in June they filed confidentially to go public, so the picture's clear. Last year, OpenAI brought in around $13 billion in revenue, and before you say, "Pretty good." Well, the company nearly tripled that in losses. In 2025, OpenAI had a net loss attributable to the company of 38 and a half billion dollars. By OpenAI's own internal estimates, they expect to burn well over $100 billion between now and 2029. And here's the cherry on top. On top of all of these horrible fundamentals, the valuation is worse. OpenAI's last funding round valued the company at $852 billion, more than 65 times its revenue. Another side note, how did ChatGPT know I was talking about itself here? Anyways, these aren't bets on whether these are good companies. These are bets that ride on blind optimism, which reminds me of what goes down as maybe the funniest quote in finance history. And if you haven't heard of this story, you're in for a treat. It even beats out the Jamie Dimon cockroach story from a few videos ago. One of the people who stood at the very center of what's considered the worst financial crisis in history admitted a crisis was coming out loud on the record right before everything broke. In the summer of 2007, months before the entire global financial system nearly collapsed, Charles Prince, the CEO of Citigroup at the time, was asked about the bank's continued exposure to risky lending and deal financing, even as the credit markets
-
12:13
, obre el vídeo en una pestanya nova
were starting to look increasingly stretched. His answer became one of the most infamous lines in the history of finance. He said, "When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be complicated, but as long as the music is playing, you've got to get up and dance. We're still dancing." So, he wasn't saying the party would last. He actually was saying the opposite. He knew it wouldn't. He was saying as long as the money was flowing, he was going to keep dancing anyway, because the second the music stopped, whoever was still on the floor would be the one who lost. He understood that underneath all the dancing, it was really a giant game of hot potato, and the only thing that mattered was making sure you'd pass the hot potato on to someone else before the music cut out, which is exactly what you're watching now. Except the potato is stock in an AI company priced for perfection. The players are the founders and the insiders, passing it to the next eager buyer. Every one of them knows someone eventually gets left holding it, but none of them know exactly when the passing stops. So, the only rational move is to hand it off now to the biggest, most enthusiastic crowd of buyers they can possibly find, the United States stock market. So, let's go back to the beginning. At the start of this video, I asked you a question. If these really are the most valuable companies in the world, and the future is as bright as everyone keeps promising, then why are the people who know them best in such a hurry to sell? We've spent this whole video circling that question and giving context. Now we can finally answer it. It's because it's the smart thing to do. The people who run these companies aren't dumb. They can see the gap. They see that prices
-
13:45
, obre el vídeo en una pestanya nova
have sprinted miles ahead of the fundamentals. They know that the market has priced these companies for a future where every one of these bets pay off perfectly. But they're also in the middle of an AI arms race, so they need deep pockets and an appetite for a bet with a slim chance of ever paying off can only last for so long, which means whoever sells first gets to sell into the hungry crowd. It doesn't actually matter if these companies are good or not. The price already assumed it. There's little room left for good news and enormous room left for disappointment. Eventually the disappointment. Eventually the fundamentals will catch up. They always do, but I can't tell you when. I don't have a magic stopwatch that can predict when this bubble pops. I don't know if it's in a month, in a year, or 3 years from now. I don't know if these companies grind higher for a long time before any of it matters. Nobody knows that and anyone who stares into a camera, hands you a date, and acts like they do know is lying to you. The reality is you don't need the date. You just need to be able to read the room, which is the reason I made this video and my channel in general is to help you read the room you're standing in so you're not the last one to notice the music. And if that's worth something to you and the version of finance you actually want, hit subscribe. Because you don't need to know the exact moment the music stops to know one thing. You don't want to be the last one on the dance floor when it does.